This article studies two questions that are debated by theorists but so far have rarely been examined empirically: First, whether judges in civil law countries tend to make efficient decisions; second, whether in real litigation judges suffer from the anchoring effect. We examine cases regarding compensation by trespassers to landowners for the trespassers' unlawful use of the land. Judges in Taiwan use the formula "rent=land value*yield rate" to compute the unjust enrichment of the trespasser. In practice, the land value is the pre-filed self-assessed land value that is below market value. Judges have a large room in determining the yield rate. Our research tests whether judges adjust the yield rate to award market rent or judges' adjudicated rates are influenced by the rates claimed by the plaintiff (the anchor).
Dora is an absentee landowner. One day, upon return of her year-long oversea trip, Dora found out that Phil has been placing his logs and gravel on her land without her consent. In most, if not all, jurisdictions around the world, Dora can request Phil to remove his things from her land. The more difficult question is whether Phil is obliged to compensate Dora and how compensation should be calculated. As Dora had no plan to use the land and Phil's actions did not cause Dora any actual harm, a tort claim will not get Dora very far. Instead, Dora should base her claim in unjust enrichment (or restitution) law. A major distinction between a tort claim and an unjust enrichment claim is that the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate any harm in the latter; rather, the plaintiff needs to establish that the defendant has been benefitted at the expense of the plaintiff without any justifiable cause. Still, how much has Phil been enriched by using Dora's land?
The conventional wisdom of law and economics is that courts should "mimic the market" (Posner 1998) . Indeed, several countries have concluded that the unjust enrichment in this context is equivalent to rent-a hypothetical rent that both parties would have agreed if they had bargained for it before the land in question was used unconsensually. For example, in the U.S., according to Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §40 comment b., defendant's unjust enrichment may be identified with ordinary rental value.
1 Courts and scholars in Germany also use "equivalent to rent" as the standard for calculating compensation to landowners.
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The scholarly literature in Germany and the U.S. does not describe in detail how courts in practice assess the amount of rent, though one could reasonably guess that the assessment procedure would involve appraisers who use rent value of comparable land as a basis for the assessment. 3 If courts systematically under-assesses 1 See Illustration 3 of §40 for a case that is similar to the vignette about Dora and Phil above. Note also that Reporter's Note c. of §40 points out that historically, restitution is unavailable for trespass and dispossession discussed in this article. 2 For German court cases, see BGHZ 20, 270; BGHZ 22, 395 . For German scholarly literature, see Buck-Heeb (2011: 3559) ; Sprau (2013 Sprau ( : 1302 . For introduction to German unjust enrichment law in English, see Krebs (2004) and Dannemann (2009) . 3 To be sure, appraisers' assessments do not always approximate market value. As one of us has empirically demonstrated in the empirical study of eminent domain compensation cases in New York City (Chang 2011) , the court-adjudicated property value is often greatly over-or under-assessed.
rent-failing to mimic the market-potential land users might prefer trespassing to bargaining for a property right to use land, as trespassing saves bargaining costs, prevents delays, and reduces the paid rent.
This article empirically investigates whether courts in Taiwan have mimicked the market in determining the rent in unjust enrichment cases, and if not, what drives the deviation. Our study can be put into the broader context of exploring whether career judges in a civil-law jurisdiction tend to make efficient decisions. Whether common law courts tend to make efficient laws is famously contended in Posner (1973) and discussed in many works in the past several decades (e.g., Priest 1977; Rubin 1977) . 4 Civil-law courts have less rule-making discretion than their common-law counterparts do (Arruñada and Andonova 2008a: 86) , 5 but judges in civil-law countries still have room to interpret statutes, such as the civil code, and oftentimes have discretion in determining the outcomes of the cases at hand. We contribute to the debate by empirically examining the behaviors of judges in Taiwan-career judges in a civil law country. One of us has conducted empirical studies on this issue in the past. Chang (2012b) finds out that, opposite to Heller (2008) 's suggestion, courts in Taiwan, in dealing with co-ownership partition cases, tend to order partition by sale instead of partition in kind when physically dividing the land renders the post-partition land parcels fragmentary. In addition, the Civil Code of Taiwan gives courts a large discretion to determine whether to remove buildings that encroach on the adjacent land. Chang (2013b) finds that the most significant determinant of the court's decision is the size of the encroached part of the neighboring land. A minor infringement tends to lead to preservation of buildings, while a large-scale trespass often results in removal. These two case studies suggest that courts in Taiwan are inclined to make efficiency-minded decisions. 6 But one swallow does not a summer make. This article further explores the judicial behaviors in private law litigation in Taiwan.
Courts in Taiwan compute the annual rent by multiplying owner's pre-filed self-assessed land value and an annual real estate rental yield rate (hereinafter "rental 4 In a recent empirical work, Niblett, Posner, and Shleifer (2010) find out that the economic loss rule in tort law, over four decades, does not converge to efficiency. 5 Arruñada and Andonova (2008a) and Arruñada and Andonova (2008b) 's explanation for the limitation on the rule-making power of civil law judges is to protect freedom of contract from being interfered by judges hostile to free market. 6 Arruñada and Andonova (2008a: 121) also argue that removal in the case of minor good-faith encroachment would be inefficient.
yield rate" or simply "rate"). No law or doctrine prescribes how judges set the rental yield rate (hereinafter the "judicial yield rate"), other than the 10% statutory cap and the doctrine that judicial yield rate should be no larger than plaintiff's claimed yield rate. Self-assessed value is lower than government-assessed market value, 7 and the magnitude of the deviation is assessed and publicized by the government. Our findings suggest that in calculating rent-equivalent compensation in unjust enrichment cases, courts in Taiwan do not take market rent as a reference point: In our econometric models, a higher "(estimated) market yield rate" 8 does not lead to a higher judicial yield rate. There is only weak statistical evidence that a wider gap between market value and self-assessed value leads to a higher judicial yield rate.
Moreover, most judicial interest rates are lower than market rental yield rates. If market rent is not the benchmark, how do judges determine the judicial yield rate?
The second part of our empirical inquiry reveals that the judicial yield rate is greatly influenced by the plaintiff's claimed rental yield rate (hereinafter "plaintiff's claimed rate")-the anchoring effect. Experimental studies on judges have shown that judges are subject to the power of anchors (Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2000: 787-794; English and Mussweiler 2001; Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski 2005 : 1286 -1293 Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2007: 19-21; Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich 2007: 171-173) . 9 While these authors have teased out the anchoring effect in neat experimental settings, we extend the study of the anchoring effect to a real litigation setting.
As we will elaborate below, the unjust enrichment cases studied here are the ideal setting to examine the anchoring effect of the number proposed by plaintiffs (and defendants) on the number determined by judges. In short, in these cases, parties do not make claims-and judges do not adjudicate-based on objective standards that could be available, such as market value of land and market yield rates of land. 7 We do not have comprehensive data on market value of real estate in Taiwan before 2012 (and no one else does). The market value we refer to here is the government-assessed market value, which is not based on state-of-the-art hedonic regression models and might under-assess market value (Chang 2009 ). 8 We use hedonic regression models to estimate market yield rate (see Part III.C). For lack of pre-2012 market data, we use market yield rates in December 2012 as a proxy for market yield rates in our research period (see Part IV.A). 9 Specifically, Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich (2007: 172) study interest rates and find that they are a "largely irrelevant but still influential anchor" for bankruptcy judges. The interest rate they studied, technically speaking, is not exactly the same as the judicial yield rate examined here. Yet it suggests how judges might struggle with determining an annual rate.
Instead, parties and judges provide only casual reasoning. Moreover, the cases are randomly assigned to one judge or a three-judge panel; in some but not all cases, defendants provide specific counter claims. These variations enable us to examine the changes in anchoring effect in different litigation settings.
We find evidence for strong anchoring effect. The larger the difference of "plaintiff's claimed rate minus market yield rate," the larger the difference of "judicial yield rate minus market yield rate." Put differently, when plaintiffs over-claim, judges tend to over-award. 10 Consistent with the prediction by the psychology literature, when the defendants explicitly raise a lower counter claim, the aforementioned anchoring effect appears to be weakened. There is no statistically significant difference between a decision by one judge and that by a three-judge panel. Value (ACLV) (in the order of frequency used in our database). Every three years, local governments in Taiwan assign a PALV to each land parcel. Landowners are then allowed to report a self-assessed DLV to replace the PALV, as long as the DLV is between 80% and 120% of the PALV. The self-assessed value is the tax base for property taxes (Chang 2012a) . The default tax rule is that if private landowners do not declare a DLV, it will be presumed to be 80% of the PALV (without any adverse effect). As a result, most landowners do not bother to take any action. In short, for privately owned land, DLV=0.8*PALV. 12 As for the ACLV, every year local governments in Taiwan assign an ACLV to each land parcel. It is used as the benchmark for levying land value increment tax. 13 Both the PALV and the ACLV are below government-assessed market value. This is common sense in Taiwan. The central government publicizes the ratios of the PALV to government-assessed market value and the ratios of the ACLV to government-assessed market value on the official website of the Department of Land Administration Ministry of the Interior. 14 In 2013, the PALV is on average 20% of government-assessed market value, whereas the ACLV is on average 85% of government-assessed market value. Given the relationship of DLV and PALV, the DLV of private land would be on average 16%
(=20%*80%) of the government-assessed market value.
As for YIELD_RATE, Article 97 of the Land Act of 1946 stipulates a 10%
ceiling. Article 97 is intended to regulate the yield rate of urban residential land and buildings only, but most judges apply the cap to urban non-residential land and 11 This formula is not used in every case. When the two parties had a lease before the unlawful possession happens, courts often use the rent stipulated in the expired lease to calculate the compensation due to the plaintiff. This type of cases account for most court cases that are sampled but not coded, as no yield rate was determined. 12 For public land, DLV=PALV. 13 For an introduction of the PALV and the ACLV, see Chang (2009; 2013a 
Mimicking the Market
Our first research interest is to ascertain whether the court-adjudicated rent approximates market rent. Court judgments themselves, however, offer little help in revealing judges' true motivation, as judges at most draw on a judgment template, decorate it with a few facts from the case, and dish out a judicial yield rate. Our hypothesis is that judges manipulate judicial yield rates to render a market rent to the plaintiff. As explained in the previous sections, the ACLV and the PALV, not to mention the DLV, is below market value (Chang 2012a; 2013a) . The gaps between these three values and the market value in each county/city widely differ. The 15 In about a dozen cases, courts consider the 10% cap to be non-applicable. Nonetheless, in only two cases, the awarded judicial yield rate is above 10% (30% and 15%). These two cases are omitted from our analysis. 16 As Hans and Reyna (2011: 145) point out, this external cap may also operate as anchors. 17 Note that the judicial yield rate (YIELD_RATE) is a rental yield rate for real estate, not a "prejudgment interest rate" (Knoll 1996) or "judicial interest rate" (Acciarri and Garoupa 2013) . Probably because lawyers and courts in Taiwan confuse judicial yield rates with prejudgment interest rates (the Chinese terms for them are the same!), no plaintiff asks for awarding of prejudgment interests. 18 This issue does not arise in all cases. In 93% of the observations in which the court takes an explicit stand, the court follows the five-year rule.
existence of this gap is common knowledge in Taiwan, and ratios If our conjecture is correct, the judicial yield rate will approximate what we call "adjusted yield rate," which equals [(government-assessed market value / DLV) * market yield rate].
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For our purpose, we will compute the ratio of court-adjudicated rent to estimated market rent 21 (hereinafter "rent ratio"). A rent ratio of 1 suggests that courts have mimicked the market, while a ratio of >1 (<1) indicates that judges over-(under-)assessed rent.
Affected by Parties' Anchor
If judges do not adjust judicial yield rates to award market rent to the plaintiff, we would explore the underlying reasons. We are particularly interested in teasing out the "anchoring effect" caused by the plaintiff's claimed yield rate. The anchoring effect describes the phenomenon that people's estimate of an unknown quantity stays close to the number that people considered-be it the last four digit of their social security number or phone number (Ariely 2008: 25-48; Kahneman 2011: 119-128) .
Considering the anchoring effect in this context is appropriate for the following reasons. First, unlike in most lawsuits, the plaintiff in an unjust enrichment lawsuit before a judge in Taiwan does not have to "prove" how she comes up with the claimed yield rate, nor does she need to provide evidence of market rental yield rates 19 These ratios are average numbers. That is, the ratios of PALV to government-assessed market value may vary within a jurisdiction. Also, as noted above, government-assessed market value does not always accurately reflect real market value. Thus, we cannot use government-assessed market value and the ratios to reverse-engineer the real market value. 20 Replace ACLV or PALV in the formula if it is the judicial land value. 21 Regarding estimating market rent, see Part III.C.
or market value of her land. 22 Most plaintiffs at most vaguely claim that their land is located at a thriving neighborhood, but the association of their arguments with the specific claimed yield rate is ambiguous. The same pattern applies for defendants and courts. As a result, there is a large room of discretion for courts to determine the amount of judicial yield rates within the two caps mentioned above. The discretion opens up the opportunities for judges to be influenced by anchors.
Some may contend that the plaintiff knows about market rental yield rate better than the judge, and thus the plaintiff's claimed rate may contain useful information;
consequently, it is not surprising and normatively unproblematic for the court to be affected by the plaintiff's claim. We respectfully disagree. As shown in Figure 2 , most plaintiffs claim 5% and 10%, probably because the statutory prejudgment interest rate is 5% and the statutory cap for judicial yield rate is 10%. It is highly unlikely that market rental yield rates simply bounce between 5% and 10%. Indeed, plaintiff's claimed rate is only weakly correlated with our estimated market yield rate (r=0.174) or with adjusted yield rate (r=0.199), as shown in Table 1 . 23 Finally, if the plaintiff's claim does reflect the real market yield rate, it is rational for them to present evidence to support their claim. Nonetheless, in the nearly one thousand cases we code, we never observe such a practice. In short, plaintiff's claimed rate may not be an entirely meaningless anchors (as the last four digit of one's social security number), but it is not very meaningful or informative, either. 24 Rather, it is more like the plaintiff's wishful thinking. As elaborated below, in order to tease out the unreasonable of plaintiff's claim, we use "plaintiff's claimed rate minus market yield rate" as the predictive variable.
22 Market value and yield rate of land can only be ascertained (to a certain extent) by professional appraisers. But their services are not obtained in the cases we study. 23 Interestingly, if only observations in 2012 are included (as we uses market data in 2012 to estimate market yield rates), the correlation coefficients reduce to 0.04 and 0.04. 24 For meaningful anchors, such as asking price of a house, see Epleya and Gilovich (2010: 22) . Second, variances in whether defendants provide counteracting anchors enable us to test whether the anchoring effect is weakened when both parties quarrel with the right judicial yield rate. Defendants make specific counter-claim in yield rates in less than 11% of the cases (see Table 5 ). 16% of the defendants only contend that the plaintiff's rate is too high, and about three-fourth of the defendants do not challenge plaintiff's yield rates at all, as their litigation strategy is often to dismiss the case altogether. Our hypothesis is that the plaintiff's claimed yield rate serves as a powerful anchor for judges who do not know how to set judicial yield rates. To be more exact, the difference of "plaintiff's claimed yield rate minus market yield rate"
(at least when it is positive) is positively correlated with the difference of "judicial yield rate minus market yield rate," other things being equal. When defendant counters with an interest rate of his own, we conjecture that the aforementioned anchoring effect would be weakened.
Finally, we also examine whether the power of anchors will be weakened if multiple judges deliberate before setting the judicial yield rate. There are two countering forces at work here: on the one hand, in the deliberation process, counter-evidence to the plaintiff's claimed rental yield rate is more likely to be raised.
Thus, judicial yield rates will be less influenced by the plaintiff's claimed rate. On the other hand, the "group polarization theory" (Sunstein et al. 2002: 57-61) suggests that a panel of three judges are more likely to render extreme decisions than a single judge.
Given the anchoring effect, a three-judge panel might be seduced by the anchors more.
The judicial procedural rules in Taiwan enable us to test whether the rental yields determined by a single judge or a panel of three judges are different. In principle, a single judge handles cases in the court of the first instance in Taiwan. Nonetheless, if a case is (randomly) assigned to a junior judge (one with less than 2 years of experience on the bench), two senior colleagues will join her to form a panel (this happens in 7.6% of our observations; see Table 5 ). By adding a stand-alone variable "three-judge panel" and an interaction term of three-judge panel and the difference of "plaintiff's claimed rate minus market yield rate," we can examine whether the anchoring is attenuated or aggravated in a three-judge panel.
B. Structure Models on Judicial Yield Rate

Model Specifications
To test the above hypotheses, we run regressions with robust standard errors and clusters by cases (as one case may produce multiple observations). Notice that the market yield rates (r m ) can be evaluated by plaintiffs, defendants and judges based on the publically observed land characteristics. In a fair judgment procedure, the judicial yield rates (R) should not systematically deviate from the market yield rate, unless a judge observes extra information from the plaintiff that justifies adjustment of judicial yield rates from r m . We reasonably posit that (1) a plaintiff who owns private information that could increase her compensation will reveal it to the court (and the defendant); (2) the court can only take the information into account when the defendant has an opportunity to present counter evidence; and (3) the court will discuss the information in the written judgments. When reading the hundreds of written judgments, we observe no such evidence or discussion at all. Therefore, we assume no private information is contained in plaintiff's claim. As a result, any difference between plaintiff's claim and market yield rate that affects deviation of judicial yield rate from market yield rate is considered the anchoring effect.
Specifically, to explore the relationship between these two deviations, we first estimated the market rental yield rate by the observed land characteristics (see Sub-section C for the estimation method). Then, we calculate the deviations of plaintiff's rate and judicial rate from market yield rate, 25 (b-r m ) and (R-r m ), and run regressions to capture the effects. However, given the fact that Article 97 of the Land Act imposes a 10% ceiling and the fact that a judicial yield rate cannot exceed the plaintiff's claimed yield rate, the judicial yield rates are bounded by the plaintiff's claimed yield rates in our data set. In statistics, it is common to use a Tobit-type model to handle the regressions with upper limits. Thus, our analysis is based on the following regression model:
where R-r m is the observed deviation of a judicial yield rate (R) from the market yield rate (r m ) under the upper limit, R * -r m is the latent counterpart capturing the judges' true deviation without upper limit, (b-r m ) is the difference between plaintiff's claimed rate and market yield rate, 27 X is a vector of other independent variables, and β is the coefficient vector of the X. When γ=0, no averaged anchoring effect exists; and when γ=1, we have complete anchoring and R=b. Moreover, we also estimate the anchoring effects (γ) when plaintiffs' claims exceed or fall below the market yield rates. The independent variables (in X) capture information or factors that could also explain the deviation of judicial yield rates from market yield rates. More specifically, these variables control for the characteristics of the two litigating parties, the characteristics and claims of the plaintiff and the defendant (PT), the size, value, length of encroachment, and usage of the land, nature and extent of the land encroachment (LD), and the defendants' claims (IN). Dummy variables to capture time (YR), the strata of location (ST), and zoning (Z) fixed effects are also included.
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PT includes natural log of the numbers of plaintiffs and defendants; dummies on whether the plaintiff and the defendant are a corporation or a government agency; and 26 Here, we assume that ε i ~N(0, σ 2 ) is independently and identically distributed. The model can be estimated by maximum likelihood using the following Tobit-type likelihood: and 1 otherwise. 27 Note that 15% of the plaintiff's claims are missing. 28 We coded but did not include the variable on the culpability of the defendants. In 819 observations, in only two cases do courts explicitly consider the culpability (in one, the defendant is intentional, and in the other, the defendant is no-fault). As the law does not impose on the plaintiff the obligation to act sooner, and unjust enrichment is not a fault-based system, it is not surprisingly that the court never mentions anything related to the plaintiff's culpability. dummies on whether the plaintiff and the defendant are represented by attorneys. 29 Besides, a dummy variable captures whether the plaintiff is the landowner or holds a lesser property interests. A series of dummy variables controls in what way the defendant is a holder of real property interests, including; "defendant is a usufructuary of nearby land or building"; "defendant was simply an unlawful possessor"; "defendant owns an unregistered building nearby"; "defendant was a tenant"; "defendant built an unregistered building on the land in question"; and "defendant type unknown. The baseline variable is "defendant is a (co-)owner of nearby land or building."
LD includes natural log of the area of land that the defendant has encroached on.
Also included is natural log of the "pre-determined land value ($/m 2 ) adopted by the court" (hereinafter "judicial land value" 30 ). LD also includes a continuous variable that represents the ratio of the judicial land value to government-assessed market value. 31 This variable enables us to test whether courts have adjusted the judicial yield rate to provide the plaintiff with the market rent. There is also a dummy variable that controls whether the land is arable (the interest rate of which is statutorily capped at 8%). Finally, the regression models also control for the length of trespass. Not all judicial decisions provide accurate information regarding the length of time. In 40% of the observations, only minimum length of time is known, as most courts interpreted the law to confer only five years of compensation, and thus from the judgment it is only clear that the encroachment had lasted for at least five years. 32 In order not to lose so many observations, we presume that the minimum length is the actual length. 33 A variable that represents the natural log of the number of plots involved is 29 We have also tried the natural log of the number of attorneys representing the plaintiff and that of attorneys representing the defendant. The result is essentially the same. 30 As said, it could be DLV, PALV, or ACLV. For public land, DLV=PALV. For private land, the DLV almost always equals to 80% of the PALV. Indeed, DLV=0.8*PALV in all of the cases in our database. Nevertheless, in 4 (12) observations involving private land, the court uses the PALV (ACLV), instead of the DLV, to calculate the rent. The land value captured by this variable is the land value used by the court to calculate the rent. That is, in all but 16 cases, this variable reflects the DLV (which may or may not equal the PALV, depending on whether the land is state-owned). In the 16 exceptions, this variable reflects the PALV and ACLV, which are higher than the DLV. The few cases that draw on market value or rent stipulated in a prior lease are excluded from the regression models. 31 The Ministry of the Interior publicizes the ratio of the PALV to government-assessed market value and the ratio of ACLV to government-assessed market value. I use them to compute the ratios used there. 32 In some cases, courts are just obscure about the exact length of trespass. 33 We have run the regressions with only observations that contain accurate length information, and we have run the regressions without the time variable. The results are essentially the same.
included. Finally, a dummy variable that indicates whether the unlawful use of the land is commercial is contained. TY represents a number of dummy variables that capture the nature of the trespass. The category of cases include "constructing building" 36 ; "land used as storage" 37 ; "tenant continuing to use land after lease expires"; "tenant continues to use land after lease is vacated"; "co-tenant using land without permission from other co-tenants"; "borrower continuing to use land after contract expires"; "land used as parking lot"; "land used to grow crops"; "access to landlocked land"; "buying building right in auction without acquiring right to use land" and "miscellaneous."
The baseline variable is "boundary encroachment."
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YR is a series of dummies (one for each year) that controls the timing of the judgment. Z are 6 zoning dummies that capture 7 types of zonings: non-urban (residential), urban (industrial), urban (residential), urban (business), urban (agricultural), and urban (other). The baseline variable is non-urban (agricultural). As for ST, following Hou et al. (2008) , we categorize the 309 towns and boroughs (under 34 This is understandable. The court is bound to determine the interest rate between the interest rates claimed by the two parties. Thus, for the defendant, claiming any interest rate above zero could have nudged the judges toward awarding a higher judicial yield rate. 35 The values of observations in which the information is missing are coded as 0. 36 The defendant built a construction entirely on the plaintiff's land. 37 The defendant put lumber, steel, concrete, etc. on the plaintiff's land. 38 The defendant's building, mainly situated on a neighboring plot owned by the defendant, encroaches over the land boundary.
counties and cities, respectively) in Taiwan into seven tiers based on socio-demographic variables (including age, education, industrial structure, occupation, and personal income). Stratum 1 is the most developed, while stratum 7 is the least. Our current data have few observations in strata 6 and 7, so we combine them and use it as the baseline. Five other dummy variables capture strata 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 which represent central business district, industrial and business districts, growing towns, towns with traditional industries, and lowly developed towns, respectively.
Reported Models
We run four sets of structure models, and each set contains two regression models. The first model of each set 39 uses one deviation variable for the plaintiff and one for the defendant. The value of these two variables could be positive or negative, as market yield rates could be higher than or lower than the parties' claimed rates. The second model of each set 40 uses two deviation variables for the plaintiff and two for the defendant: one that captures positive and zero deviation, whereas the other captures negative deviation. The first set of models (Models 1-2) only includes independent variables related to the claims by the two parties and the three-judge-panel variables. The second set of models (Models 3-4) adds several variables that are later shown to be most relevant to the determination of judicial yield rates. The fourth set of models (Models 7-8) use as many control variables as we can.
The third set of models (Models 5-6) uses the same variables as the fourth set, but excludes observations in which the judicial yield rate is 5%. Five percent is the discount rate of future tort damages and the default prejudgment interest rate for contract disputes in Taiwan. Judges who are clueless of how to set the right judicial yield rate might pick 5%. The necessity of excluding these 5% cases in these regression model can be illustrated in the following way. Assume that in two different cases, one plaintiff claims an yield rate of 5% and the other 10% (when the market yield rate is 3%), and in both cases the judges set the judicial yield rate at 5% because 39 Models 1, 3, 5, and 7. 40 Models 2, 4, 6, and 8.
of its familiarity (thus, in this sense, 5% here is like an anchor). In the former case, the judicial decision might be interpreted as suffering from the anchoring effect, while in the latter case, the anchoring effect appears to be weak. In fact, the plaintiff's claim produces no anchoring effect at all. To screen out the confounding effect, observations in which courts settle on 5% are thus excluded. Granted, not all cases of 5% judicial yield rates involve judges' single-minded affinity towards 5%, but some may, and we have no way to sort them out. No other rates can embody such a strong, potential anchoring effect, so no other observations are excluded.
C. Hedonic Regression Models on Market Rental Yield Rate
Identifying market rental yield rates is critical to our examination of whether courts in Taiwan mimic the market. Ideally, we will run hedonic regression models on rental yield rate, and then use the coefficients to estimate the rental yield rate of the land in question. Nevertheless, no comprehensive, reliable, available data on market sale prices and market lease rents of real estate are available before 2012. The available data after August 2012 enable us to estimate the market value and lease rent of the land parcels in our litigation database in December 2012 (the last month of our research period, and the month with the most numerous observations of transactions).
The estimated market value is used as an independent variable in unreported regression models. The division of lease rent to market value-yield rate-is used in all regression models.
We run two ordinary least square (OLS) hedonic regression models with robust standard errors, one for leases and one for sales. The dependent variable is the sale price or lease rent. The independent variables control for the land size, zoning, transaction month, and the number of plots involved. Only simple land sales and leases are included. That is, transactions involving buildings are omitted, as the judicial cases we sample also are limited to simple land disputes. The models take the following form:
41 One counter argument to our exclusion practice is as follows: There are 409 different judges/judge panels in our dataset. Among them, 12 judges have produced more than 5 observations over three or more years. None of these dozen judges always awards the same judicial yield rate, nor do they adopt the same ratio of judicial yield rate to plaintiff's claimed rate. Repeat judges are not numerous enough for us to tell whether 5% is a popular and/or strong anchor. Perhaps some judges are subject to three anchors: plaintiff's claim rate, defendant's claim rate, and 5%. This would be too complicated for us to model. At least, this concern justify our running models without including the 5% judgments.
P= α+ βA +θN + δZ + ηM + γS+ ε where P is natural log of prices; A is natural log of land area; N is natural log of the number of land plots involved; Z are 9 zoning dummies that capture 10 types of Table 2 . Table 3 breaks down the data by strata. Summary statistics for sale prices and annual lease rents (the dependent variables) and for the land area (the key independent variable) are reported in Table 4 . 42 Observations with leased land zoned in non-urban (industrial) and non-urban (preserved) are 2 and 6, respectively. We include properties zoned as such in the regressions, but find that the estimated market yield rates for these observations are extreme (such as >100%). Thus, we exclude observations with land zoned in these two categories. 43 More exactly, real estate agents have to report the lease rents to the government, while landlords who administer the lease themselves are not obliged to do so. and 2010. The research period is chosen so that our database includes cases as early as three years before the reform and those rendered as late as about three years after the reform. Finally, we focus on decisions by the court of first instance. As emphasized by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich (2007: 4) and Eisenberg and Heise (2013), we study decisions by district/trial courts because most cases are handled by them and many of these decisions are final. In all, 2956 cases show up in our search. We randomly sample 34% of the cases in each of the 21 district courts in Taiwan, in order to have about 1000 cases in our dataset. After excluding small-claim and simple-proceeding cases that somehow show up in our search and excluding cases in which the judges do not determine a judicial yield rate (as judges may rely on market rent or contract rent),
we have 698 cases, producing 818 observations.
As Figure 1 shows, 41% of the judicial yield rate is 5%. A 9% judicial yield rate is even more unpopular than a 1% judicial yield rate. Other judicial yield rates take up at most 12% of the observations. The mean judicial yield rate is 0.057. Figure 2 shows that 59% of the plaintiff claims an interest rate of 10%, whereas 24% (11%) of them request 5% (8%). Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression models are shown in Table 5 . Notably, the ratio of judicial land value to market value ranges from 8.3% to 84.9%, demonstrating its variance and the great divide between the two values. 45 The median area of land possessed by the defendant is 105 square meter (1130 square feet).
44 That is, a land parcel and the house upon it can be and are often owned by different persons. 45 All the ratios above 40% are from cases in which the court equates official land value with the higher ACLV. We have run regressions without these observations. The results are, again, essentially the same. Defendant is a government agency 3
Plaintiff with attorneys 80
Defendant with attorneys 41
Arable land 9
Land used for business purpose 5
Three-judge panel 8
Defendant claiming types 100 Defendant counters with an explicit rate 11
Defendant counters that the plaintiff's claimed yield rate is too high 16
Plaintiff types 100 Plaintiff is the landowner 99
Plaintiff holds a lesser property interest 1
Defendant types 100 Defendant is a (co-)owner of nearby land or building 27.2
Defendant has a right (not ownership)to use nearby land or building 4.0
Defendant was simply an unlawful possessor 42.1
Defendant owns an unregistered building nearby 6.4
Defendant was a tenant of the land in question 13.7 Defendant built an unregistered building on the land in question 6.4
Defendant type unknown 1.1
Case types 100 Building encroachment 4.5 Constructing building 64.5
Land used as storage 2.7
Tenant continuing to use land after lease expires 8.7
Tenant continuing to use land after lease vacated 5.0
Co-tenant using land without permission from other co-tenants 3.8
Borrower continuing to use land after contract expires 3.2
Land used as parking lot 0.5
Access to landlocked land 0.5
Land used to grow crops 1.7
Buying building right in auction without acquiring right to use land 0.7
Other case types 4.3
Zoning (N=725) 100 Non-urban (agricultural-not prime)
1.8
Non-urban (agricultural-prime) 7.9
Non-urban (residential) 3.0
Urban (residential) 47.5
Urban (business) 13.8
Urban ( .1 plaintiff's claimed yield rate Figure 3 The distribution of the ratio of judicial land value to market value N=816. Observations with >60% ratios are those in which the court uses the ACLV to compute rent.
V. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
A. Mimicking the Market?
As Table 6 shows, our hedonic regression models capture market sale prices and lease rents quite well, as the R-square is 0.73 and 0.56, respectively. Not surprisingly, the land size is highly statistically significant at the 0.001 level. The sign, relative size, and statistical significance of the five stratum dummies show that, again not surprisingly, land parcels in better economically developed region are rented and sold at a higher price. The regression coefficients enable us to estimate the market value and lease rent (and thus the yield rate) of the land parcels under disputes.
Feeding these estimates into the dataset of judicial cases allows us to test whether the judicial interest rates approximate the market yield rate (see the distribution of which in Figure 4) , and we find the answer to be negative. First, judicial interest rates barely correlate with market yield rates (correlation coefficient=0.087; see Table 1 ). Because judges are aware of the fact that DLV is much lower than market value, one would posit that judges may adjust upward the yield rate to make the final judicial award approximate market rent. To test this possibility, we calculate the "adjusted yield rates." As Figure 5 shows, if courts aimed to mimic the market in setting judicial interest rates, most rates should be >10%, while courts only award <=10% (see also Figure 7 ). Put differently, judges in Taiwan tend to award below market rent to the plaintiff. More exactly, only 78 of the 700 observations (11%) have rent ratios >1, indicating that court-adjudicated rent is above market rent, while 604 of the 700 observations (86%) have a ratio <0.8 (Figure 6 ).
Notably, as Figure 7 demonstrates, adjusted yield rates in cases in which courts adopt the ACLV (rather than the DLV or PALV) as the judicial land value all tend to approximate market yield rates. Moreover, there is no apparent pattern between market yield rate (or adjusted yield rate) and judicial yield rate (Table 1; Figure 7 ).
46
Regression models on judicial yield rate provide a more nuanced picture. The variable that captures the gap between judicial land value and government-assessed market value always has negative signs and are (marginally) statistically significant (see Table 7 ). This finding suggests that judges appear to be on the right track-awarding higher premium above market yield rates when the available statistics pointing out that the official land value is more distant from the government-assessed market value. Nonetheless, judges' adjustment falls short, and judicially adjudicated rents are still much below estimated market rents. In short, Taiwanese courts' decisions on judicial yield rates can hardly be regarded as efficiency-enhancing or market-mimicking. 46 One may contend that our finding is due to omitted variable bias. The land in question has been occupied and used by a trespasser for a few years before its owner finds out and sues. This suggests that the owner has no plan to use the land anyway-perhaps a sign that the land can hardly be used for reasons not captured in our calculation. We acknowledge this possibility. But given that the detailed judgments do not mention this factor, and the trespasser apparently finds the land useful, the land may not be that "un-rentable" anyway. That being said, perhaps the true market rental yield rates for the plots in question may be a little bit below our point estimate market rental yield rates. This huge and prevalent gap is mainly due to the gap between the judicial land value and the government-assessed market value, and partly due to the differences between judicial yield rate and market yield rate.
B. Anchoring Effects
In the first three sets of models, the coefficients of the variable "plaintiff's claimed rate minus market yield rate" have positive signs and are statistically significant at the 0.001 level (see Figure 8 for the visualization of the relationship between this variable and the dependent variable). To be more exact, in Models 2, 4, and 6, where the aforementioned variable is divided into two variables (one with positive or zero value and the other with negative values), only the variables that capture plaintiff's over-claiming are statistically significant. In Models 7 and 8, these variables become statistically insignificant. As the only difference between Models 7-8 and Models 5-6 is the inclusion of observations in which the judicial yield rates are 5%, our theory is that, as noted above, the 5% rate as anchor has produced a much weaker, even negative, anchoring effect, such that the average effect becomes indistinguishable from zero (in more than 200 observations, judicial yield rate=5%). In all, the empirical results are substantial evidence for the existence of anchoring effect in real litigation.
Our explanation is that the anchoring effects exist due to "insufficient adjustment" (Kahneman 2011: 120-122) . In a typical case, a Taiwanese judge first learns of the plaintiff's claimed yield rate, gathers more information from the two parties, and finally makes a trip to the land in question to observe the neighborhood. We posit that judges who know the 10% legal cap would tend to award 10% to the highest-yielding parcels and 1% or 2% to the lower-yielding parcels. Plaintiff's (over-)claims enter into judges' minds as anchors, and then judges adjust downward, depending on the land yielding capacity. Judges, however, may often adjust insufficiently, and thus gives the plaintiff a judicial yield rate that is too high.
Note, however, that the magnitude of the coefficient of "difference between plaintiff's claim and market yield rate" tends to decrease when more independent variables are added to the regression models. This suggests that the judicial decision-making is influenced by other factors as well, such as land size and length of trespass. Not controlling for these factors would lead to over-estimation of the anchoring effect.
In all eight regression models, the variables "three-judge panel" and the interaction term "difference of plaintiff's claimed rate minus market yield rate * three-judge panel" do not exhibit statistically significant results. We offer two theories.
First, the group polarization effect is neutralized by the deliberation effect. Second, a three-judge panel is still a one-man show. Wang and Wei (2012) , in their empirical studies of deliberation process of three-judge panels at the district court level in Taiwan, show that in some cases, the responsible judge in the panel drafts the decisions and thus naturally dictates the final outcome. Nevertheless, in some cases, the chief judge in the panel, because of his/her seniority, has the final say in the outcome. Judicial yield rates are not a legal issue that could arouse strong emotion or stark legal debate. Thus, we posit that the either the responsible judge or the chief judge may give a number, and others do not object. As a result, a three-judge panel does not make a difference in determining judicial yield rates.
The psychology literature has found that keeping counter evidence in mind weakens, or even neutralizes, the anchoring effect (Mussweiler, Strack, and Pfeiffer 2000; Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001) . In our study, the defendant's claimed rental yield rate serves as the anchor-inconsistent knowledge. When two numbers-one high, one low-are before the judges, and both can be informative or self-serving, judges may be more conscious of their decisions on judicial yield rates. In our model, we use two variables to test this hypothesis. The interaction term ("plaintiff's claimed yield rate minus market yield rate" * a dummy on whether the defendant raises an explicit counter yield rate) has negative coefficients and are statistically significant in 6 of the 8 models. The variable that captures the difference of defendant's explicit claimed yield rate minus market yield rate" has positive coefficients and are (marginally) statistically significant in 6 of the 8 models. This suggests that defendants' claim weakens the anchoring effect of plaintiff's claim, and the lower the defendant over-claims (perhaps by mistake or for other reasons), the lower the judges over-award. The empirical evidence is thus consistent with the psychological thesis. Figure 8 The effect of plaintiff's deviation from market yield rate on the deviation of judicial yield rate from market yield rate N=580. Jitter effect is applied in this figure to make the overlapping dots more visible. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we empirically study the unjust enrichment cases involving unlawful possession of land in Taiwan. Doctrinally, the compensation paid by the trespasser to the landowner should be equivalent to rent. District courts in Taiwan, however, award less than market rent. Moreover, courts are strongly influenced by the plaintiff's claim. Our efforts in estimating market rental yield rate partly explains why courts suffer from the anchoring effect-there were no data to count on or counter the claimed yield rate advocated by the plaintiff. Hence, while the prior literature has found that judges in Taiwan have tended to make efficient decisions in certain private law contexts, in unjust enrichment cases, judges in Taiwan have not been mimicking the market. 
